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Scaling Greenpeace: From Local Activism  
to Global Governance 
Frank Zelko ∗ 
Abstract: »Greenpeace skalieren. Vom lokalen Aktivismus zur globalen Steue-
rung«. Greenpeace was founded in Vancouver in the early 1970s. Initially, it was 
a small anti-nuclear protest group composed of Americans and Canadians, 
peaceniks and hippies, World War II veterans and people barely out of high 
school. Twenty years later, it was the world’s largest environmental NGO, with 
headquarters in Amsterdam, branches in over forty nations, and a regular pres-
ence at international environmental meetings throughout the world. This arti-
cle will chart Greenpeace’s growth throughout its first two decades, in the pro-
cess examining how the organization became influential at several levels: in 
local politics in places like Vancouver; at the national level in countries such as 
Canada, New Zealand, the USA, and Germany; and at global forums such as the 
International Whaling Commission and various UN-sponsored environmental 
meetings. It will analyze the combination of activist agency and political op-
portunity structures that enabled Greenpeace to gain political influence. I ar-
gue that Greenpeace’s influence largely stemmed from its engagement with 
what political scientist Paul Wapner calls “world civic politics,” which in this 
case involves the dissemination of an ecological sensibility that indirectly influ-
ences behavior at multiple scales, from individuals, to governments, to multi-
lateral organizations. Only in this way could a group with relatively limited re-
sources hope to influence millions of individuals and powerful governments. 
Keywords: Greenpeace, environmentalism, scaling activism, world civic politics, 
multilateral institutions. 
1.  Introduction 
In 1971, a group of environmental activists in Vancouver set out to protest US 
nuclear testing in the remote Aleutian Islands in the North Pacific. Greenpeace, 
as they would eventually call their movement, was composed of Americans and 
Canadians, peaceniks and hippies, World War II veterans and people barely out 
of high school. Within a little over a decade, Greenpeace would become the 
world’s largest environmental NGO, with headquarters in Amsterdam, branches 
in dozens of nations, and a regular presence at international environmental 
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meetings throughout the world. Greenpeace’s influence largely stemmed from 
its engagement with what political scientist Paul Wapner (1996) calls “world 
civic politics,” which in this case involves the dissemination of an ecological 
sensibility that indirectly shapes behavior at multiple scales. Greenpeace’s 
tactics and the issues it chose to campaign against necessitated a multi-pronged, 
interlinked strategy that could influence opinion at different political levels, 
from small communities to multilateral governance bodies and powerful nation 
states. In the process of attempting to develop political scalability, Greenpeace 
itself became a multi-level NGO with local, regional, national, and international 
offices, each with different priorities, strategies, tactics, and degrees of authority. 
This article examines Greenpeace’s early years in the 1970s, focusing in 
particular on how the transnational nature of its campaigns shaped its political 
strategy and, by extension, scaled its institutional structure accordingly. 
With regard to the approaches of multilevel governance and scaling, as de-
veloped by political scientists and critical geographers, the case of Greenpeace 
indicates the strong trend in the late 20th century towards new modes of gov-
ernance and the co-operative state (Bernhardt 2017, 200-1, this HSR Forum). 
While political scientists have highlighted the role of economic liberalization 
and supra-national cooperation in the rise of globalization, the Greenpeace case 
shows the important role of civil society organizations as a trigger in the emer-
gence of global governance (Zürn 2013; Bernhardt 2017, 208).  
2.  The Origins of Greenpeace 
The founding of Greenpeace, which in its early years existed in a fluid state 
between a social movement and a non-governmental organization, is a compli-
cated story, but the short version goes like this: In the late 1960s, numerous 
Americans found themselves living in Canada due, in one way or another, to 
various disagreements with their government’s foreign policy. In addition to 
young draft evaders, there were older immigrants from the WWII generation 
who wanted to ensure that their sons would not get drafted into the US military 
once they came of age. Others left because they found US preparations for 
nuclear war to be unconscionable. Quite a few were Quakers. In Vancouver, a 
fertile center of the Canadian counterculture, these older Americans came into 
contact with numerous hippies and radical activists who shared their misgiv-
ings about issues such as nuclear warfare and the malign influence of the US 
military-industrial complex. Many were also concerned about issues such as 
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pollution, while some of the Americans were members of the Sierra Club, one 
of the most venerable environmental organizations in the United States.1 
This disparate array of anti-war activists, environmentalists, and the politi-
cally disaffected members of the counterculture were galvanized by US nuclear 
testing on Amchitka Island, a tiny speck of tundra in the faraway Aleutians. 
Apart from their general opposition to nuclear weapons and their concerns 
about fallout, many feared that the tests – conducted in a geologically unstable 
area – could set off earthquakes and a tsunami that would, in the words of 
journalist and Greenpeace founder, Bob Hunter, “slam the lips of the Pacific 
Rim like a series of karate chops” (Vancouver Sun, Sept. 24, 1969). Between 
1969 and 1971, the tests inspired much opposition and numerous protests. In 
1969, for example, thousands of protesters descended on the US-Canadian 
border, disrupting the smooth flow of people and goods for the day. It was at 
one such protest on the British Columbia-Washington border that the nucleus 
of the Greenpeace coalition was formed. It was here that two older American 
activists – Irving Stowe from Rhode Island and Jim Bohlen from Pennsylvania 
– met up with various student radicals and other young protest groups and 
decided to form an organization that would try to stop the next major nuclear 
test, codenamed Cannikin, scheduled for late 1971. They gave themselves the 
vivid, if somewhat clumsy appellation, the Don’t Make a Wave Committee 
(DMWC), and began meeting regularly at Stowe’s house in Vancouver. After 
many fruitless discussions, Bohlen and his wife, Marie, came up with a plan. In 
the 1950s, Quaker activists that were part of the American Friends Service 
Committee had attempted to sail into the nuclear test zones in the Marshall 
Islands, but were arrested before they could get there. The DMWC would at-
tempt to succeed where the Quakers had failed. They would charter a boat and 
sail it into the nuclear test zone, thereby bearing witness to an ecological crime 
and pressuring the Canadian government to oppose the tests and the US gov-
ernment to abandon them (Bohlen 2001). 
Both politically and logistically, this was an ambitious objective. From the 
beginning, however, Greenpeace had to negotiate the complex task of dealing 
with several layers of authority simultaneously, frequently trying to play one 
off against the other. The Canadian government, mindful of public opinion, 
was critical of the American tests on Amchitka and made its protests known 
within the constraints allowed by the close relationship between the two na-
tions. In a note to the U.S. Department of State, the Canadian ambassador in 
Washington made “it clear that [the Canadian government] cannot be regarded 
as acquiescing in the holding of these nuclear tests […] [and] would have to 
hold the United States government responsible for any damage or injury to 
Canadians, to Canadian property, or to Canadian interests resulting from the 
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tests” (d’Easum 1971, 4), a sentiment that the Prime Minister’s office repeated in 
its correspondence with the DMWC. Despite this stance, the Canadian govern-
ment nonetheless tried on several occasions to hinder the DMWC’s campaign. 
The Department of National Revenue, for example, expressed skepticism toward 
the group’s application for charity status, arguing that it “fail[ed] to see the 
relationship between the acquiring of a boat and the publicizing of the adverse 
environmental effects of nuclear explosions on Amchitka Island” (Lawless to 
Stowe, June 10, 1969, Greenpeace Fonds, Vancouver [hereafter GF]). 
Another obstacle for the DMWC was the refusal by fisheries minister, Jack 
Davis, to provide their vessel, which they named Greenpeace, with government 
subsidized insurance. Davis justified this stance by pointing out that the crew 
clearly did not intend to go fishing (Davis to Coté, May 19, 1971, GF). This 
would effectively have put a halt to the protest, since purchasing private insur-
ance would have been prohibitively expensive, perhaps $50,000 or more. For-
tunately for the DMWC’s plans, Davis’ electorate was West Vancouver, a 
district where support for the Greenpeace voyage was strong. The DMWC set 
about pressuring Davis to change his mind. Bob Hunter wrote a scathing col-
umn, castigating Davis for aiding the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
by attempting to scuttle “the only determined Canadian opposition to the test” 
(Vancouver Sun, June 3, 1971). Well-known CBC broadcaster and journalist, 
Ben Metcalfe, who by then had joined the campaign, made similar comments 
in his broadcast. Metcalfe, who lived in West Vancouver, and other DMWC 
members met with local residents, held meetings with them, and convinced 
many to join their cause. Before long, Davis’ office was inundated with letters 
and phone calls from his constituents, demanding that he reverse his decision. 
Caving in to pressure, Davis changed his mind, blaming his original decision 
on one of his underlings, and granted the Greenpeace crew the right to pur-
chase the standard fishing insurance (Davis to Coté, June 24, 1971, GF). 
A few days before the Greenpeace was due to set sail, federal customs offi-
cials revealed that they would not let the boat depart because it was not regis-
tered as a passenger ship. This forced the ship’s captain, John Cormack, to put 
fishing equipment on board and to register everyone as a crewmember of a 
professional fishing vessel. Hunter once again questioned the motives of the 
Canadian government, arguing that they must surely have known that this issue 
was going to arise and their decision to spring it on the Greenpeace crew a few 
days before they were due to embark was merely another attempt to halt or 
delay the voyage (Vancouver Sun, Sept. 18, 1971). Nevertheless, by mobilizing 
the local constituents of federal ministers, as well as organizing a media cam-
paign at the provincial and national levels, Greenpeace was able to overcome 
the Canadian government’s low-level interference strategy. 
In addition to Canada, opposition to the proposed nuclear test was also 
strong in Alaska, forcing the AEC to conduct a series of public hearings in 
Anchorage and Juneau in the last week of May 1971. Jim Bohlen and Patrick 
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Moore, a young ecology graduate student at the University of British Colum-
bia, represented the DMWC, while various scientists, academics, journalists, 
politicians, and environmentalists also joined the mounting chorus of AEC 
critics. California senator, Alfred Alquist, recalled that a 1964 earthquake cen-
tered in the Aleutians had “generated a Tsunami that Californians will not soon 
forget” (Congressional Record-Senate 1971, 18093). The giant wave had 
caused considerable damage throughout California, particularly in coastal 
towns such as Crescent City, where a twelve foot wave had destroyed twenty-
seven blocks of the downtown area, crushing three hundred buildings and caus-
ing five deaths and $11 million worth of damage.2 In support of this argument, 
Bohlen quoted James N. Brume, a scientist at the California Institute of Tech-
nology, who suggested that there was “no logical reason why a nuclear explo-
sion couldn’t be the initiating event in a series of events causing a major earth-
quake. The larger the blast, the greater the possibility of its triggering such a 
series.” And there had never been an underground blast as big as Cannikin 
(ibid., 18091).  
 Although a tsunami was not impossible, a more realistic threat was that the 
blast’s immense power would fracture the rock between the blast chamber and 
Amchitka’s surface, creating a series of cracks and fissures through which 
radioactive material could escape. Scientists pointed out that of the 230 under-
ground tests conducted in Nevada, at least 67 had leaked varying amounts of 
radioactivity. Bohlen cited evidence that some of the fallout had already been 
recorded in Canada, a fact that constituted a violation of the 1963 Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty (Bazell 1971; Congressional Record – Senate 1971). He also ques-
tioned the AEC’s assumption, as outlined in its environmental impact statement, 
that there existed “safe” levels of radiation dosage. Bohlen expressed the 
DMWC’s hard line on this issue, insisting that “no conclusive evidence exists to 
suggest that there are any safe levels of radiation dosage beyond that of nature’s 
normal background radiation” (Congressional Record – Senate 1971, 18091). 
In the lead up to the test, the DMWC developed a two-pronged political 
strategy that would become a mainstay of Greenpeace’s modus operandi. On 
the one hand, they employed a rhetoric of righteous moral anger intended 
largely for the general public’s consumption, a common enough tactic among 
social movement organizations. Appealing to popular ideas of ecology and to 
broadly held notions of peace, security, and human rights, the DMWC would 
use evocative slogans and pithy catchphrases that could be picked up by the 
media and which would resonate with the masses.3 For example, they charac-
                                                             
2  For dramatic video footage and photographs of the aftermath of the tsunami in Crescent 
City, see: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8pitAGlz5x0> (accessed December 23, 2016). 
3  The development of Greenpeace’s media strategy is a vital part of its history, although one 
which, for reasons of space, I will not fully explore in this article. For a useful overview, see 
Dale (1996). 
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terized the AEC as “ecological vandals” and argued that “Amchitka may be the 
link in the chain of events which will bring human history to an end” (Congres-
sional Record – Senate 1971, 18091). Bohlen spoke of the U.S. defense um-
brella as a “death canopy for Canada” (Vancouver Sun, Feb. 5, 1970), while 
Stowe claimed that the AEC was creating a “pocket of poison” on Amchitka 
that was “filled with the most lethal and terrible kinds of polluting radiation on 
the planet” (Georgia Straight, Nov. 11, 1971). The AEC, Stowe continued, 
demonstrated “that power pollutes and nuclear power pollutes absolutely.”4 
Patrick Moore argued that if the U.S. wished to “indulge itself” and test a de-
vice that they claimed was safe, “why not explode it in the geographic center of 
the United States in central Kansas?” (Wall Street Journal, June 24, 1971).  
The DMWC recognized, however, that if they wanted elite opinion – scien-
tists, academics, policy makers – to take them seriously, they would have to go 
beyond pithy slogans and the rhetoric of moral outrage. Hence, they also put 
together a more “objective” report that took the form of a scientific review 
article. DMWC member and Greenpeace photographer, Bob Keziere, a chem-
istry graduate student, was the lead author. Eschewing apocalyptic rhetoric and 
moral rebukes, the report summarized both the AEC’s position and that of its 
opponents, buttressing its arguments by citing credible research and distin-
guished scientists (Keziere 1971). Such reports would become commonplace 
and increasingly sophisticated in future Greenpeace campaigns, enabling 
Greenpeace to appeal to the scientific and policy community while their spec-
tacular direct actions captured tabloid headlines. 
Attempting to influence national governments through the tactics discussed 
above was clearly a key aspect of the DMWC’s strategy, but it was not the only 
political level on which they operated. The Greenpeace was employed as a 
vehicle for both direct action and education. Although the boat, due to a com-
bination of poor weather and AEC delays, was unable to make it to Amchitka, 
Bohlen felt that the crew could still perform the important, if less glamorous, 
task of stumping from town to town like eco-evangelists and raising people’s 
awareness of nuclear and environmental issues. Thus they stopped at numerous 
coastal towns in Alaska and British Columbia. In a three-day visit in Kodiak, 
for example, the crew held several meetings with various concerned organiza-
tions. Their conversations with locals demonstrated that the voyage was having 
an impact and that even Alaskans, traditionally among the most conservative 
and patriotic of Americans, could be opposed to U.S. nuclear testing and open 
to learning more about environmental issues. The local newspaper also gave 
them positive coverage, asking Alaskans to put aside their prejudices and em-
brace the Greenpeace message: 
                                                             
4  The Georgia Straight was Vancouver’s countercultural newspaper and a major early sup-
porter of Greenpeace. 
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Because their speech was spiced with the jargon of a generation yet to be rec-
ognized here and because beards and long hair were in abundant evidence, 
many locals found it easy to ignore the implications of the visit […] [But] if 
the Greenpeace visit helped even a few people see Kodiak’s own stake in the 
tests more clearly, then the delicate confrontation of ideologies will have been 
worth the negativism that the visit also spawned. (Island Times, Oct. 22, 1971) 
After Kodiak, the Greenpeace continued down the west coast, repeating the 
same procedure in the southern Alaskan port of Ketchikan and at Prince Rupert 
in British Columbia, before arriving at the Kwakiutl fishing village of Alert 
Bay. Much to the crew’s surprise, the Kwakiutl invited them to participate in a 
ritual ceremony that was normally reserved for weddings, funerals, and the 
election of chiefs. They were led into the village longhouse and asked to stand 
in front of a great cedar wood fire surrounded by giant totems. As old Indian 
men “with hands like roots pulled from wet clay” banged away on huge wood-
en drums and women in red-beaded robes danced to the pulsating rhythm, the 
Greenpeacers were anointed with water and eagle feathers and made into blood 
brothers of the Kwakiutl people. “It was as though the Kwakiutl were somehow 
able to read our minds,” Hunter later recalled, “or had somehow succeeded in 
understanding perfectly the experiences we had just been through” (Hunter 
1979, 91). Members of the counterculture tended to revere Indians, who ap-
peared to live in close harmony with nature, and the Kwakiutl experience 
helped convince Greenpeace that they had a special relationship with native 
peoples throughout the world (Deloria 1998; Krech III 1999). From a political 
perspective, tribes such as the Kwakiutl operated as quasi-independent units 
within the traditional nation state. By casting themselves as the champions of 
indigenous peoples, Greenpeace was able to exploit the complicated and 
fraught relationship between nation states and tribal governments, leveraging 
the moral authority and public sympathy accorded to indigenous peoples on 
matters of environmental concern. Thus governments frequently found them-
selves in an awkward position whereby their opposition to Greenpeace was 
conflated with a lack of concern for indigenous rights. 
In early 1972, the DMWC officially changed its name to “Greenpeace.” As 
a result of the Amchitka campaign, Greenpeace was now familiar to many 
Canadians, particularly in British Columbia, and to Americans who read the 
newspapers closely and were concerned about nuclear weapons testing. Beyond 
North America, however, few people would ever have heard of it. A notewor-
thy exception, and one which serves as an example of Greenpeace’s nebulous 
status somewhere between a one-off campaign, an organization, and a social 
movement, was a group of anti-nuclear anarchists in the United Kingdom who 
were associated with the long-time pacifist publication, Peace News. The group 
had subscribed to Vancouver’s alternative newspaper, the Georgia Straight, 
and was impressed with Irving Stowe’s “Greenpeace is Beautiful” column. 
Borrowing from Stowe, they published a broadsheet supplement to Peace 
News, which they called Greenpeace. They used the term not to describe an 
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organization, but rather, as a general philosophy of life denoting a marriage of 
peace and ecology. By 1972, the group, which, in true anarchist fashion con-
tained no “members” but only “people,” began to refer to itself as Greenpeace 
London and in effect became the first Greenpeace group outside Canada (Peace 
News, July 9, 1971).5  
In some instructive ways, Greenpeace’s early history was similar to that of 
Friends of the Earth (FOE), the international environmental organization estab-
lished in 1969 by long-time Sierra Club director, David Brower. By the early 
1970s, FOE had become a loosely knit international environmental organiza-
tion. With the aid of two young Americans, a physics student named Amory 
Lovins and a Paris-based lawyer, Edwin Matthews, Brower set up Les Amis de 
la Terre in France, choosing a radical young economist, Brice Lalonde, to lead 
the new organization (Lamb 1996).6 Similar events occurred in the UK and 
West Germany, so that by 1971, FOE was already providing a model for the 
establishment of more activist-oriented and internationally focused environ-
mental organizations. Both Greenpeace and FOE concentrated primarily on 
anti-nuclear campaigns, with FOE focusing on the civilian uses of nuclear 
power and Greenpeace on nuclear weapons testing. Each of them, furthermore, 
had a desire to internationalize the environmental movement in order to gain 
greater influence with multi-lateral institutions like the United Nations. Unlike 
Greenpeace, however, FOE was largely the brainchild of one man and started 
life with a clearer vision of where it was heading and how it would be orga-
nized. Therefore, although Greenpeace quickly elevated direct action environ-
mentalism to spectacular new levels, it would be several more years before it 
would develop the kind of coherent organizational structure that FOE already 
possessed by 1971. Nevertheless, the early histories of the two organizations 
frequently intertwine; throughout the 1970s, for example, FOE activists were 
often responsible for setting up new Greenpeace offices, particularly in Europe.7 
                                                             
5  The Greenpeace London group still exists as a separate entity from Greenpeace UK. In the 
early 1990s, two of its activists were involved in a high-profile libel suit with McDonalds, 
which became known as the “McLibel” affair. McDonalds tried to implicate Greenpeace In-
ternational in the lawsuit, but there was no legal connection between the small group of 
anarchists and the international NGO. On Greenpeace London and the “McLibel” affair, see 
<http://www.mcspotlight.org/people/biogs/london_grnpeace.html> (accessed Dec. 23, 2016). 
6  Lovins has become an internationally renowned environmental advocate who heads the 
Rocky Mountain Institute in Colorado. Lalonde became a leading green politician in France 
and was made environmental minister during the Mitterand presidency. He was also an im-
portant figure in the early history of Greenpeace in Europe. 
7  For more on FOE’s early years, see Tom Turner’s (2015) biography of David Brower.  
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3.  Mururoa, Mon Amour 
By 1972, Jim Bohlen and Irving Stowe were exhausted from their work for the 
DMWC. They selected CBC journalist Ben Metcalfe, a man who belonged to 
the same WWII generation as themselves, to be Greenpeace’s new leader. 
Metcalfe quickly turned the organization’s attention to French atmospheric 
nuclear testing on Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific (Danielsson & Dan-
ielsson 1986; Khan 2011). He felt that the Amchitka campaign had been “naïve 
bourgeois” because its organizers had announced its schedule and its limita-
tions – the fact that they could only afford to stay on the boat for six weeks, for 
example – thereby providing the “enemy” with a huge tactical advantage. Fur-
thermore, they had been very distant from the center of power in Washington 
D.C., which greatly reduced their visibility in the U.S. media and their com-
mensurate influence on American public opinion (Vancouver Sun, April 1, 
1972). To avoid a similar fate, the Mururoa campaign would need to be more 
cunning in order to keep the French guessing. Greenpeace, Metcalfe insisted, 
would also need to conduct a direct action in Paris in order to alert the French 
population to the impact the nuclear tests were having in the South Pacific and 
to demonstrate the strength of international opinion against French nuclear 
policy (Metcalfe interview). 
Metcalfe was keen to ensure that the campaign was truly international and 
he planned accordingly. He would try to organize at least two boats to sail into 
the test zone – one from New Zealand or Australia and one from South Ameri-
ca. He also planned to organize protests in Paris and at the United Nations 
Environmental Forum in Stockholm, which he hoped would lead to spontane-
ous anti-nuclear protests in other European capitals. In order to influence Cath-
olic opinion throughout the world, he would seek an audience with the Pope 
and try to persuade him to publicly endorse the Greenpeace campaign, as well 
as sending activists to New York to lobby the United Nations to condemn 
French nuclear testing. The whole campaign, he hoped, would be distilled into 
a simple message for the mass media: The arrogant French were ignoring world 
opinion and endangering people’s lives and the environment in order to devel-
op weapons of mass destruction (ibid.). 
When they arrived in New Zealand to kick off the protest, Metcalfe and oth-
er Greenpeace activists were by no means entering an anti-nuclear vacuum. In 
1965, Richard Northey, a University of Auckland student, formed the Commit-
tee for Resolute Action against French Tests, and throughout the late 1960s, he 
and other members forged contacts with leaders of Polynesian independence 
movements. In 1971 in Wellington, a group of Pacific nations, including New 
Zealand and Australia, founded the South Pacific Forum in order to gain a 
greater degree of cooperation in political and economic matters in the region. 
This event, combined with the French announcement in the same year that they 
were embarking on an expanded program of testing that would continue into 
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the foreseeable future, helped focus attention on nuclear testing in the South 
Pacific (Locke 1992). 
In Auckland, Metcalfe found a Vancouver native named David McTaggart, 
a 40-year-old boom-and-bust developer who had recently left the high stress 
world of California ski resort development. After sailing around the western 
Pacific for a few months, McTaggart was ready for a new adventure, and 
Metcalfe convinced him to join Greenpeace and sail his yacht into the French 
testing zone at Mururoa Atoll. McTaggart had never heard of Greenpeace and 
did not have much interest in nuclear policy, or for that matter, politics in gen-
eral. Nevertheless, with some helpful persuasion from his enthusiastic young 
girlfriend Ann-Marie Horne, he came to see the idea of such a voyage as a 
worthy challenge to his seamanship. He also grew increasingly irritated with 
the way the French were treating the South Pacific. So, in the southern winter 
of 1972, McTaggart led a small Greenpeace crew – including Metcalfe for part 
of the voyage – to Mururoa Atoll, where he annoyed the French navy until they 
got fed up and rammed his yacht. He repeated the voyage in 1973. By this time, 
the French were thoroughly sick of him, and a group of commandos boarded 
his yacht and beat him with their batons, almost blinding him in the process 
(McTaggart 1973). 
While McTaggart was sailing across the South Pacific, Jim Bohlen and Pat-
rick Moore were in New York, trying to raise awareness of Greenpeace’s cam-
paign at the UN headquarters. Other Greenpeace activists had flown to London 
and Paris to help organize marches and demonstrations. Without letting 
McTaggart or anyone else know, Metcalfe had arranged for a “decoy” boat to 
sail from Peru in order to keep the French navy on their toes (Metcalfe inter-
view). He left McTaggart in Rarotonga, before flying on to Mexico City and 
then Rome, where he organized an audience with the Pope. The result was that 
Greenpeace became an increasing source of irritation to the French, particularly 
once photographs of McTaggart’s beating and injuries appeared in newspapers 
throughout the world.  
All of this exhausting and frenzied campaigning by a few Vancouver-based 
activists and a handful of allies around the world helped make Greenpeace an 
increasingly household name in activist circles throughout North America, 
Western Europe and Australasia. In Paris, for example, about 200 English and 
French Greenpeace supporters marched toward the Elysée Palace, leafleting 
along the way, before being rounded up by police and taken to the Opera police 
station (Peace News, June 8, 1973). In Bonn, a small band of West German 
peace activists and environmentalists gathered under a Greenpeace banner and 
marched through the capital’s streets to the French Embassy (Times, June 2, 
1973). Another group of people using the Greenpeace label presented an anti-
nuclear petition to the French government. Several Australians and New Zea-
landers among them demanded sanctuary in France, claiming that their own 
countries were being poisoned by radiation from the French tests (Vancouver 
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Sun, July 11, 1973). In New Zealand, from where Greenpeace launched its 
protests against the French for three years in a row, a nascent Greenpeace 
group was formed. 
Clearly, at this stage the term “Greenpeace” could be used by anyone who 
supported the cause, without needing to ask the original Vancouver Greenpeace 
for permission. As with the Amchitka protest, Greenpeace’s multi-scaled 
Mururoa campaign focused on both local communities and nation states, edu-
cating the former and pressuring the latter with a combination of media specta-
cles, street protests, and grassroots networking. In this instance, however, 
Greenpeace also made a concerted effort to influence the United Nations, both 
through direct lobbying at its headquarters in New York City and by staging a 
series of protests at the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stock-
holm. These protests were not aimed at the UN per se. In fact, Greenpeacers 
very much admired the institution and hoped that Greenpeace would one day 
help create a “green UN” of similar scope. Rather, they were designed to 
shame the French in front of their fellow nations, forcing them to justify their 
ongoing atmospheric testing when the USA, USSR, and Britain had agreed to 
stop the practice back in 1963. In addition, Greenpeace was able to take ad-
vantage of the global media that had descended on Stockholm for the event 
(McCormick 1989; Macekura 2015). 
4.  Saving the Whales 
By 1974, Bob Hunter and a few others within Greenpeace’s countercultural 
circle were beginning to grow weary of the anti-nuclear voyages, feeling they 
had reached their plateau. Instead, they had become excited about a possible 
campaign against whaling. Over the previous year, Hunter had gotten to know 
Paul Spong, a scientist studying killer whales at the Vancouver Aquarium. 
Spong had come to the conclusion that whales were extraordinarily intelligent, 
complex, and wondrous animals, and was horrified by the fact that tens of 
thousands continued to be slaughtered each year. If any organization had the 
ability to challenge whalers on the high seas, Spong felt, it was Greenpeace. 
Hunter needed little convincing, and the two of them came up with a plan: 
Greenpeace activists would track down a whaling fleet in the Pacific Ocean, 
then maneuver small inflatable motor boats between the harpoon boat and the 
whales. They would do this while the International Whaling Commission 
(IWC), the multilateral institution in charge of regulating whaling, was having 
its annual meeting. The dramatic footage from their campaign would hopefully 
put immense public and governmental pressure on the IWC to pass a moratori-
um on commercial whaling (Weyler 1986). 
Before they could enact their plan, Hunter and Spong had to convince the 
influential older Quaker members that it was worth redirecting hard-earned 
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funding from anti-nuclear protests to the anti-whaling campaign. The Quakers 
were wary of younger countercultural activists like Hunter, whom they viewed 
as unreliable hippies too easily drawn to mysticism and esoteric ideas. In late 
1974, however, Irving Stowe died of cancer and Jim and Marie Bohlen moved 
to an isolated island to set up an experimental farm. With Greenpeace’s elder 
statesmen out of the picture, Hunter wrote, “There was no one left to resist any 
further Greenpeace’s transformation from nuclear vigilantism to whale saving. 
And there was no one left to prevent us from dropping the hard brick-by-brick 
logic of the normal political world completely, seizing our I Chings and allow-
ing signs and visions to determine our course” (1979, 149).8  
In late 1974, Hunter and Spong began to put together a plan. The first stage, 
as with earlier Greenpeace campaigns, was to raise consciousness among local 
people in Vancouver, both to attract volunteers and raise funds for what would 
be an expensive, transnational operation. They booked a medium-sized theater 
where Spong presented the First Annual Greenpeace Whale Show, a slide show 
accompanied by music and vivid stories about whales. They also organized a 
media event at the Vancouver Aquarium, Spong’s former employer, where 
Spong could inform journalists about killer whales’ complex intelligence. The 
Whale Show raised enough money to send Spong on a speaking tour in Japan, 
one of the world’s major whaling nations. From there, he flew to Norway to try 
to dig up information about where in the vastness of the North Pacific Green-
peace was likely to find a whaling fleet. By portraying himself as a neutral 
scientist, he was able to talk his way into the records office of the Bureau of 
International Whaling Statistics, where he wrote down the coordinates of the 
Soviet whaling fleet’s movements in previous years (Weyler 1986). 
In mid-1975, against all odds, Hunter’s motley crew of countercultural ac-
tivists tracked down the Soviet whaling fleet around 100 miles off the coast of 
Northern California. The protestors leapt into their zodiacs and began harassing 
the whalers, while cameramen and photographers recorded the dramatic imag-
es. Two days later, they arrived in San Francisco to find a throng of reporters 
lined up along the Embarcadero to greet them. Immigration officials had to 
restrain the clamoring journalists, who leaned across the boat’s gunwale with 
their cameras and microphones, impatient to talk to the heroic, if somewhat 
fanatical environmentalists who had risked their lives to save the whales from 
the Soviet killers. Hunter talked to virtually every TV and radio station in the 
Bay Area, and the story, complete with dramatic photos and film footage, was 
printed and broadcast throughout the United States and the world. According to 
one study, the first whale campaign garnered more media coverage in the Unit-
ed States than all of Greenpeace’s previous four years of anti-nuclear actions 
combined (Cassidy 1992). Walter Cronkite, the doyen of American newsread-
                                                             
8  The I Ching is an ancient Chinese divination text that was popular among members of the 
1960s counterculture.  
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ers, introduced them to a massive TV audience, featuring them on his “That’s 
the Way It Is” evening broadcast. The New York Times published a lengthy and 
overwhelmingly positive feature on the organization. As well as describing the 
clash with the whalers, the Times cited Spong’s experiments with killer whales 
as proof of whales’ unique intelligence, thereby adding scientific credibility to 
Greenpeace’s list of virtues. As a media event, the campaign was successful 
beyond Hunter’s wildest dreams (Flowers 1975).  
In London, meanwhile, the media had picked up Hunter’s report about the 
confrontation with the whalers and reported the story widely just as the IWC 
meeting was winding up. As the Greenpeace representative in London, Spong 
was suddenly besieged by reporters wanting to know more about the campaign. 
All the major British newspapers carried Hunter’s story, some on the front 
page, suddenly providing Greenpeace with newfound credibility among both 
the media and the anti-whaling protestors. The Soviet and Japanese delegates, 
irritated by the story, referred to Greenpeace as “pirates.” Although conserva-
tion forces within the IWC once again failed to muster the number of votes 
necessary for a moratorium, stories of activists willing to risk their lives in 
order to stop whaling sent alarm bells through the various pro-whaling delega-
tions. The fact that several of those involved in the action had been Americans, 
and that the events had taken place off the California coast, was of particular 
concern due to the fact the United States was the strongest proponent of the 
moratorium. The Soviets could not help but have interpreted Greenpeace’s 
actions within the broader context of the Cold War, and Greenpeace was also 
not averse to taking advantage of Cold War tensions if it furthered their anti-
whaling crusade. The Japanese, for their part, feared that increased scrutiny of 
their whaling industry could prompt the US to invoke the 1971 Pelly Amendment 
to the Fisherman’s Protective Act of 1967, a law which enabled the US gov-
ernment to ban the importation of seafood from nations whose practices threat-
ened endangered species. It was obvious to all concerned that Greenpeace’s 
actions had succeeded in raising the struggle to a new level (Weyler 1986). 
The media success of the anti-whaling campaign confronted Greenpeace 
with the classical dilemma that many successful activist groups face: should 
their progressive politics be reflected in their organizational structure or should 
ideology take a backseat to professionalization and efficiency? The anti-
whaling campaign – which some of the older Quakers viewed as “soft” com-
pared to the prospect of nuclear warfare – prompted numerous sympathetic 
environmentalists to set up Greenpeace groups throughout North America. In 
addition to this spontaneous growth, Hunter also embarked on a tour to foster 
the spread of the organization throughout Canada. In the fall of 1975, he and 
his wife Bobbi traveled across the country, visiting virtually every major uni-
versity campus. Hunter would present a slide show and lecture about the 
Greenpeace whale campaign, while Bobbi would sit at the back selling T-shirts 
and buttons, and signing people up for membership. After each show, they 
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would be approached by at least a dozen volunteers interested in setting up a 
Greenpeace group. By Christmas of that year, there were approximately a 
dozen Greenpeace branches throughout Canada. Some of these were made up of 
merely a handful of people selling T-shirts, while others, such as those in Toronto 
and Montreal, were more substantial organizations that were soon contributing to 
Vancouver’s campaigns, as well as mounting their own (Hunter 1979). 
5.   The Anti-Sealing Protests 
In the winter of 1976, Greenpeace turned its attention to another benighted 
marine mammal. Each year in March, hundreds of thousands of harp seals give 
birth to pure white, doe-eyed pups on the ice floes of Newfoundland and Que-
bec. The pups’ pelt is highly valued by the fur industry, and thousands of sea-
sonally unemployed fishermen take advantage of seal whelping season to sup-
plement their generally meager incomes. It is not a pretty sight. The swilers, as 
they are known in Newfoundland, simply walk up to a defenseless pup and 
smash it on the head with a spiked club known as a ‘hakapik,’ a Norwegian 
word that amply evokes the club’s function in numerous languages. The pup is 
quickly skinned and the swiler moves on to the next one, often leaving behind a 
mother seal pathetically nudging the pup’s bloody corpse. Various animal 
welfare groups had been protesting against the hunt since the mid-1960s, and 
although they had forced some improvement in its management, hundreds of 
thousands of seal pups were still being killed each winter. Greenpeace felt that 
a high profile direct action campaign would go a long way toward ending the 
annual slaughter (Zelko 2014). 
During the whale campaign the previous summer, Greenpeace’s arrival at 
various ports on the west coast had been greeted with great cheer and goodwill. 
None, of course, were expecting similar scenes in Newfoundland, but few were 
prepared for the genuine anger and sheer hatred that the locals directed toward 
the meddlesome mainlanders. And the federal and provincial governments, it 
was clear, were firmly on the sealers’ side. In response to Greenpeace’s ap-
pearance on the scene, the Canadian government passed a series of amend-
ments to the Seal Protection Act. These included banning everyone, apart from 
those associated with the seal hunt, from flying lower than two thousand feet 
over a seal herd or landing a helicopter within half a mile of a seal. These regu-
lations were transparently designed to prevent Greenpeace from protesting on 
the ice floes. The government argued that the amendments were necessary to 
prevent people from “disturbing” the seals during their breeding and nursing 
phase. However, as Hunter caustically observed, the law effectively stated, 
“you may not disturb a seal unless you are definitely going to kill it.” George 
Orwell himself, he continued, “could not have invented a nicer title for a piece 
of legislation aimed at the destruction of an animal” (Hunter 1979, 286-7). 
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With the odds stacked firmly against Greenpeace, Hunter felt it was time for 
a quick change of tactics. Clearly, the federal and provincial governments were 
not going to alter their positions any time soon. However, the local landsmen – 
the small-time swilers who were not crewmembers on the large sealing ships – 
might be persuaded to drop their opposition to Greenpeace and even support 
them on some issues. Hunter was well aware that the landsmen took a relative-
ly small number of seals compared to the predominantly Norwegian-owned 
ships, and it was clear that the landsmen did not think particularly well of the 
Norwegian firms that dominated the fur trade. He therefore sensed an oppor-
tunity to build a coalition with the landsmen against the wealthy and mostly 
foreign-owned sealing corporations. Thus Greenpeace left the landsmen to 
themselves and took their campaign offshore to protest against the sealers 
working on the Norwegian icebreakers (Zelko 2014).  
In addition to mobilizing local support against the sealing industry and the 
government, Greenpeace directed its media campaign toward the US and Eu-
rope in the hope that outraged Americans and Europeans would pressure the 
Canadian government to end the hunt. They also lobbied individual European 
governments and the European Economic Community (EEC) to ban the impor-
tation of harp seal fur. The campaign was successful in drawing global media 
attention to the annual slaughter and culminated with the 1983 EEC ban on the 
importation of harp seal products (ibid.).9 Once again, Greenpeace demonstrat-
ed the necessity of operating at multiple political scales, building alliances with 
local communities while simultaneously engaged in big-picture media cam-
paigns at the national and international levels.  
6.  From Greenpeace Tribes to Greenpeace International 
By 1976, according to Hunter, the hippies running Greenpeace in Vancouver 
could best be described as a “tribe”: “there were a couple of dozen of us whose 
lives had become so intertwined [...]. We shared each other’s clothes, we 
shared our food, we pooled our resources for parties, and like an extended 
family network, we squabbled amongst ourselves, bitched about each other, 
counseled one another, and came to think of each other as brothers and sisters” 
(Hunter 1979, 246-7). The “tribe” analogy was also appropriate for many of the 
other Greenpeace groups. In Seattle, for example, the dozen or so hard-core 
Greenpeace members shared a large house together, while those in Paris and 
London were also living, sleeping, traveling and campaigning together on a 
virtually constant basis (Treakle and Parmentier interviews). By 1978, Green-
                                                             
9  While the major market for seal products may have been suddenly eliminated, the slaugh-
tering of seals was never outlawed. Therefore, the sealing industry, with the help of sub-
stantial government subsidies, was able to gradually establish new markets for its products. 
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peace resembled nothing so much as a loose confederation of tribes, each with 
its own elders, its own internal culture, and its own idea of what Greenpeace 
was or should become. Among those in Vancouver, there was never any doubt 
that their group constituted the leading tribe. But as the power and confidence 
of the other tribes grew, they became less willing to see themselves as subordi-
nates of the elders in British Columbia. 
As the nominal umbrella organization representing all the Greenpeace 
groups in the United States, the San Francisco-based Greenpeace Foundation of 
America quickly became the largest and most complex of all the tribes. Unlike 
the other Greenpeace groups in the US and Canada, the Vancouver group had 
specifically established the San Francisco office as a subsidiary branch that 
would remain under their control. In contrast to most other Greenpeace tribes, 
which regularly mounted local environmental campaigns in their own regions, 
the San Francisco group concentrated almost exclusively on raising funds and 
awareness for the whaling and sealing campaigns. And they did this far more 
successfully than any other Greenpeace group in North America. Apart from 
the various walkathons, raffles, and canvasses that tapped into the Bay Area 
donor market, the San Francisco office also established a remarkably success-
ful nationwide direct mail program with the firm of Parker & Dodd, a fund-
raising agency that specialized in progressive causes. The Greenpeace San 
Francisco mailing list was extensive and extremely well targeted, a fact that 
prompted the campaign managers of California’s Governor, Jerry Brown, to 
offer to purchase it from them (Macy 1980). Given their financial clout, it was 
virtually inevitable that at some point, the San Francisco office would tire of 
taking orders from their cash-strapped masters in Vancouver.  
Along with San Francisco, one of the most significant Greenpeace groups in 
the US was in Seattle. Unlike San Francisco, the Seattle tribe quickly devel-
oped a reputation for being a classic consensus-oriented, Birkenstock-wearing, 
granola-eating band of grass roots activists. They mounted many campaigns in 
the Seattle area, including protest actions against polluting factories in Tacoma 
and pesticide spraying around local waterways. They also formed alliances 
with other organizations in order to protest against the Trident nuclear subma-
rine facility in Bangor, Washington. Though eager to cooperate with Green-
peace offices throughout North America, the Seattle tribe was highly sensitive 
to any requests that sounded like “orders,” regardless of whether they came 
from Vancouver or San Francisco. As one of their members explained to the 
San Francisco group: “we strive to maximize the feeling of participation for 
every member and volunteer that we have. Dictating terms of any sort without 
sufficient consultation can only deprive Greenpeace of possible valuable hu-
man resources” (Janus Masi to Gary Zimmerman, May 26, 1977, Greenpeace 
History). Such was their commitment to a grass roots structure that literally 
anybody was allowed to walk in off the street, join one of their meetings, and 
have a voice in the decision-making process (Boe interview). 
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The other thirty or so Greenpeace tribes in North America tended to fall 
somewhere in between the elite executives from San Francisco and the grass 
roots activists from Seattle. The Boston group developed a reputation for tough 
pragmatism. The Toronto outfit conducted some of the most daring and spectacu-
lar campaigns, such as parachuting into various nuclear facilities. The Hawaiian 
tribe prided itself on having made their island “the most thoroughly Greenpeace-
indoctrinated place in the world today.” According to its leader, Don White, the 
Hawaiian group had “written curricula for local schools, testified on important 
issues, earned seats on scientific commissions, launched demonstrations, influ-
enced legislation, and filled the media with Greenpeace deeds and goals.” In 
the process, they paid themselves “virtually nothing in the way of salaries” and 
even used their own personal savings to help fund various campaigns. Such 
sacrifices, White believed, made Hawaii “a real Greenpeace group” (Don 
White to various Greenpeace Groups, March 27, 1979, General Overview). The 
Hawaiian tribe was under the impression that abstemiousness and asceticism 
were necessary characteristics if one were to become a true Greenpeace activist. 
For the professionals in San Francisco, however, such an attitude was seen as 
sanctimonious nonsense. One did not have to completely sacrifice one’s middle 
class life in order to be an effective environmental campaigner.  
In Europe, meanwhile, David McTaggart had helped set up Greenpeace of-
fices in Paris and London. McTaggart had moved to France in 1974 in order to 
sue the French military for ramming his boat and physically attacking him 
during the Mururoa protests. Although he was miffed at what he felt was the 
lack of support from Greenpeace during the lengthy French court case, McTag-
gart was gradually coming around to the view that the core idea of Greenpeace 
– an international organization that relied on nonviolent action and was not 
attached to any political party or ideology – had considerable potential if it 
could be run by hard-nosed professionals rather than hippies. In other words, if 
he were at the helm, it might be possible to create a genuinely international 
organization that could effectively influence world opinion. Although he would 
not have shared the same terminology, McTaggart was clearly aiming to create 
an organization that could engage in what Wapner refers to as “world civic 
politics.” With the help of Remi Parmentier, a student radical who was barely 
out of his teens, McTaggart started a Greenpeace office in Paris, recruiting 
various Les Amis de la Terre activists who were disaffected by that organiza-
tion’s growing ties to left wing political parties in France. It was not long be-
fore McTaggart had convinced most of the new recruits that he had founded 
Greenpeace and that the Vancouver hippies were a bunch of incompetent fools 
who were destroying the organization he had fought so hard to establish 
(McTaggart 2002). 
In London, at roughly the same time, a group of FOE activists, fed up with 
what they perceived to be that organization’s increasingly mainstream style, 
decided to set up a Greenpeace office in the UK. By chance, Alan Thornton, a 
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Vancouverite who had been involved in the seal campaign, arrived in London 
at this time, also with the intention of establishing a Greenpeace office. 
Thornton answered a “flatmate wanted” ad that had been placed in the newspa-
per by Susi Newborn, one of the aforementioned FOE activists (Thornton to 
Frizell, Dec. 21, 1976, File 12, Box 5, Greenpeace Fonds, Archives Canada). 
They proceeded to invite McTaggart and Parmentier to London, and the group 
officially set up a Greenpeace UK office. Much to their surprise, however, they 
soon found that there was another Greenpeace group that had been active (alt-
hough barely so) in London since 1971. This was the group of anarchists asso-
ciated with Peace News. This outfit, which called itself Greenpeace London, 
had links to various Marxist and anarchist organizations and represented pre-
cisely the kind of marginalized, utopian radicalism that McTaggart could not 
stomach.10 Newborn, who was more sympathetic toward the group, felt uncom-
fortable about McTaggart’s rather imperialistic approach. Again, he claimed to 
be the true founder of Greenpeace and insisted that the Greenpeace London 
group were frauds who were simply trying to gain publicity by adopting the 
Greenpeace name. Before there was any time to debate the issue, McTaggart 
swiftly went ahead and incorporated Greenpeace UK. Even had they been so 
inclined, the anarchists were in no financial position to mount a legal challenge, 
and the two groups continue to co-exist to this day (Newborn 2003).11 
By late 1977, the UK group had purchased the ship that would soon become 
the Rainbow Warrior, while McTaggart, Thornton, and Parmentier were dis-
cussing the idea of forming Greenpeace Europe, which would be a loose con-
federation of autonomous Greenpeace groups throughout the continent. Soon 
thereafter, a Dutch Greenpeace office was set up, also with McTaggart’s help, 
and campaigns against Icelandic whaling, Orkney sealing, and Atlantic nuclear 
waste dumping began. Within a year, Greenpeace became a recognizable name 
                                                             
10  Thornton described the London anarchists as incompetent and inefficient: “I doubt anyone 
would even know if they disappeared, if they ceased to function” (Thornton to Frizell, Dec. 
15, 1976, File 12, Box 5, Greenpeace Fonds, Archives Canada). 
11  A letter from the Greenpeace London group to Greenpeace New Zealand conveys a sense of 
the growing schism between the advocates of a more organized and hierarchical organiza-
tion, such as McTaggart and the Vancouver group, and the grassroots anarchists. “We are 
getting an increasing number of people confused about which GP is which […] we have 
tried hard to work out our problems with the people at GP LTD, but have had very little 
come-back from them. The way that they work is very hierarchical, as opposed to our struc-
ture of collective working, so it does make trying to talk to them difficult. While traditional-
ly we have had small autonomous GP groups in various parts of the country (& world), it is 
now a situation in which the Vancouver Foundation & GP Ltd are setting up ‘branches’ of 
their own in the UK and around the world. According to what we have heard, one of the 
people at GP LTD thinks that our group is ‘too democratic’ because of our way of working. 
That should give you some idea of what we are up against. Another thing that we have not-
ed of late, while looking through some documents put out by the Greenpeace Foundation in 
Vancouver, is a claim that they are ‘Apolitical’. This is in contrast to our own libertarian 
viewpoint” (Martin Howe to Greenpeace New Zealand, May 13, 1978, London Greenpeace). 
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in much of Western Europe, and fledgling groups began to appear in West 
Germany and Scandinavia. Most of the Europeans were in their twenties and 
unlike their counterparts in Vancouver, had little time for the beliefs and rituals 
associated with the counterculture, a fact that contributed to McTaggart’s admi-
ration for the European activists at the expense of his fellow Canadians. Never-
theless, from an organizational perspective, there was a great deal of similarity 
between the groups, and Parmentier’s description of the Europeans closely 
resembles Hunter’s depiction of the Vancouver group: “We were like a small 
tribe, spending all the time together, working together, traveling together on the 
cheapest night trains, sharing each other’s sofas, music, beer cans and joints. 
Like an emerging rock band on a tour. Tribal life includes tribal wars; they can 
be bloody, sharp arguments – we did not fuck around with political correctness. 
We were faster and freer than others in the environmental movement; but it had 
also one basic cost: we were sectarians, and not very transparent and very com-
petitive” (Parmentier interview with Weyler). 
McTaggart, however, was not the only one who had visions of a more orga-
nized, professional international outfit. By late 1977, Bob Hunter, Patrick 
Moore, and others within the Vancouver group were beginning to see the need 
to establish a more formal set of ties between the various affiliates, as well as 
developing a chain of command that would facilitate a greater degree of effi-
ciency in the decision-making process. With this in mind, Moore, who by then 
had succeeded Hunter as president, sent a letter headed “Greenpeace: Where 
Are We Going?” to the various groups scattered throughout North America. 
“We are faced with a problem,” Moore began,  
that has baffled the best philosophers and politicians since the first federation 
of cave-people communities. Simply stated the problem is how can we 
achieve unity and cohesiveness as one organization and yet provide the indi-
vidual and group autonomy necessary for creativity and initiative? Somehow 
we must be both centralized and decentralized at the same time […]. Under 
the present structure, further growth is not possible without further confusion. 
There is a pressing and demanding need for organization. (n.d. Moore to vari-
ous Greenpeace Offices, Moore’s personal papers) 
Moore suggested several organizational models, including General Motors, the 
United Nations, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the Sierra Club. 
However, he was particularly taken with the idea of a structure that was based 
on an ecosystem model. Diversity in ecosystems, he noted, “tends to result in 
stability.” While this was an argument for a decentralized structure, it was also 
important to remember that “each species has a well-defined niche or function 
that it must keep to in order to maintain that stability [...]. We must stick to 
those functions and we must demonstrate the capacity to carry them out” (ibid.). 
There was no doubt in Moore’s mind that, hippie ideals aside, some degree 
of centralization and hierarchy would be necessary in order to ensure the smooth 
running of the organization, as well as preventing people from conducting unau-
thorized actions under the Greenpeace banner. To accomplish this, he drafted a 
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document he called the “Declaration and Charter.” It was a contract that care-
fully outlined the responsibilities that all the branches had to the Vancouver 
office in exchange for the use of the Greenpeace trademark. From mid-1978 
onward, all new Greenpeace branches would have to sign this document. 
Moore also tried, with varying degrees of success, to force all the existing 
North American groups to sign the contract. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most 
obstreperous affiliate was also the richest: Greenpeace San Francisco, a well-
oiled fund-raising machine, was not too keen to surrender its autonomy. In the 
process, it emboldened some of the smaller groups in the US to take a similar 
stand. 
Moore, Hunter, and others within the original Vancouver group spent over a 
year trying to convince the San Francisco group to sign the Declaration and 
Charter, but without success. So, in May 1979, with all other options exhaust-
ed, they filed a lawsuit. When word of this reached David McTaggart in Eu-
rope, he immediately boarded a plane and headed to San Francisco. If Vancou-
ver won the suit, as they probably would, then McTaggart had no doubt that 
they would turn their attentions to the budding Greenpeace groups in Europe. 
Given McTaggart’s fractious relationship with Vancouver, he was not about to 
sit quietly by while they tried to gain control of the promising European offic-
es. The Americans and Europeans, he told the San Francisco board, “must 
come out unanimously to fight, and must work towards a democratic Green-
peace US.” He suggested that the Americans offer Vancouver a settlement: in 
exchange for San Francisco paying off Vancouver’s considerable debts, Van-
couver would relinquish the rights to the name “Greenpeace” outside Canada. 
Prior to McTaggart’s visit, the San Francisco board, pessimistic about its 
chances of winning, had been prepared to bow to Vancouver’s demands. How-
ever, McTaggart managed to stiffen their resolve, and they decided they would 
fight Vancouver to the bitter end (Greenpeace San Francisco, Minutes of the 
Meeting of the Board of Directors, July 25,1979. Tussman papers). 
Having accomplished his goal in San Francisco, McTaggart then flew to 
Vancouver. He immediately organized a meeting with Hunter, the only person 
on the Vancouver board whom he respected. Patrick Moore, McTaggart insist-
ed, was leading Greenpeace down the path to ruin. He also reported that the 
wealthy San Francisco office would fight Vancouver for as long as it took them 
to win their independence, though he failed to mention that he himself had 
played a large part in this decision. Couldn’t Hunter convince Moore and the 
rest of the Vancouver board to drop the lawsuit? Hunter replied that, although 
he was in general agreement with Moore’s position, he might be able to talk 
him into toning down some of his inflammatory rhetoric, thereby creating a 
better environment for any potential compromise. Moore, however, was in no 
mood for compromise. When Hunter tried to talk him into examining possible 
settlement options, Moore felt he was being lectured by Greenpeace’s elder 
statesman. In a fit of alcohol-induced pique, he told Hunter that he was a 
HSR 42 (2017) 2  │  338 
“washed up” environmentalist whose days of leading Greenpeace were well 
and truly over. He should butt out of the matter and allow Moore to run things 
as he saw fit. Deeply wounded by his old comrade’s outburst, Hunter began to 
think that perhaps McTaggart was right. Maybe Moore was power-hungry and 
out of control (McTaggart interview). 
A few days later, McTaggart organized a meeting with the Vancouver board 
and their lawyers. With Hunter backing him up, McTaggart described his vi-
sion for the future of Greenpeace. Vancouver, he insisted, would have to drop 
the lawsuit and relinquish its rights to the Greenpeace name outside Canada. In 
exchange, a newly-formed Greenpeace International would pay off Vancou-
ver’s debts. Once Moore realized that Hunter and several other board members 
were supporting McTaggart’s plan, he eventually gave in. McTaggart’s pro-
posal, it was clear to Moore, was not so different from what he himself had had 
in mind. The main difference was that Moore would clearly not be at the helm 
of McTaggart’s new organization. Remarkably, in just a few short days, 
McTaggart had not only solved what had seemed an intractable problem, but 
had succeeded in convincing Greenpeace’s founders to effectively turn the 
organization over to him (McTaggart, 2002). 
With Vancouver’s surrender notice in his hand, McTaggart flew triumphant-
ly back to San Francisco, where he received a hero’s welcome. The various 
American branches were so relieved and grateful that the lawsuit had been 
avoided, that it became, in McTaggart’s words, “an easy day’s work to pull the 
twenty or so American offices together into Greenpeace USA. Somebody pro-
duces a map, and I draw nine different regions onto it. That’s about it” 
(McTaggart 2002, 149). For McTaggart, the entire business was reminiscent of 
the kind of wheeling and dealing he would do on a weekly basis during his 
years in the building industry.  
Several months later, McTaggart convened a meeting of Greenpeace dele-
gates from around the world. At that meeting – held in Amsterdam – Green-
peace Europe agreed to change its name to “Greenpeace Council,” and invited 
others to join the new organization. Greenpeace USA and Greenpeace Canada 
were immediately accepted as members, but in the process, had to accept the 
bylaws of Greenpeace Europe. All the national groups signed the Greenpeace 
Council accord, ceding their rights to the name “Greenpeace” in exchange for 
voting membership on the Council. Virtually overnight, the various Green-
peace tribes were merged together to create a European-dominated internation-
al organization with a large bureaucracy, a hierarchical, centralized structure, 
and with its headquarters based in Amsterdam. Not surprisingly, David 
McTaggart was voted in as the first chairman of the new international Green-
peace organization (Minutes of the Greenpeace Council International Meeting, 
Nov. 16-20, 1979, Amsterdam. Moore’s personal papers). 
Within a few months of the Amsterdam meeting, McTaggart’s Greenpeace 
International developed a sophisticated management structure, with various 
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legal, administrative, financial, and communications arms scattered throughout 
the world. It was not long before these offices were staffed by professionals 
with degrees in human resources, marketing, and accounting. Such success, 
however, did come at a cost. Greenpeace never became the leading apostle of a 
secular religion based on ecology as Hunter and other founders hoped it would. 
It also did not develop into the kind of grass roots, participatory movement that 
Irving Stowe had hoped to build. Various aspects of Greenpeace’s style and 
tactics – such as its inability to combine spectacular direct action protest with 
mass participation – compromised the development of such a movement. In 
contrast, we can look at groups such as the Clamshell Alliance and its West 
Coast counterpart, the Abalone Alliance, as examples of 1970s movements that 
engaged in direct action environmentalism, such as protesting outside nuclear 
power plants and engaging in peaceful “invasions” of nuclear facilities, while 
also embodying their intensely progressive politics in their organizational 
structure. The Clamshell Alliance, unlike Greenpeace, remained decentralized, 
unhierarchical, participatory, and consensus-driven. It engaged in what Barbara 
Epstein calls “prefigurative politics”: an attempt to convey its vision of an 
ecologically sustainable and egalitarian society not just through its rhetoric and 
protests, but also in its structure and day-to-day operations (Epstein 1991). 
7.   Conclusion 
Naturally, Greenpeace, like any organization, was not entirely responsible for 
its own rapid growth. Opportunity structures are constantly shifting, often in 
unpredictable ways, and success always entails an element of good fortune. 
Another structural factor that frequently affects organizational development is 
path dependency. The fact that Greenpeace’s early campaigns involved sailing 
to difficult-to-reach areas in order to protest nuclear testing meant that it had 
the expertise and experience to protest against whaling, nuclear waste dumping, 
and other questionable activities on the high seas. Thus, in a sense, Greenpeace, 
if it was going to succeed, had to professionalize and become a transnational 
environmental empire. Compare this to the Society for Pollution and Environ-
mental Control (SPEC), an organization that sprung up in Vancouver at almost 
exactly the same time as Greenpeace and with overlapping membership. SPEC 
was created in order to tackle local – and to a lesser extent regional – environ-
mental problems, particularly urban pollution in Vancouver. Its self-conscious 
“localism” contrasts starkly with Greenpeace’s “globalism.” For SPEC, there-
fore, success could be measured by the degree of name recognition and policy 
influence the organization was able to achieve in Vancouver (Keeling 2004). 
Given the terms that Greenpeace set for itself, however, success required 
achieving such recognition and influence on a global scale, thereby engaging in 
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Wapner’s “world civic politics.” Expansion and professionalization were there-
fore organizational and existential imperatives. 
Although they obviously did not speak the language of current political sci-
ence, it is clear that Greenpeace’s most committed activists had an instinctive 
understanding of the necessity of affecting communities, institutions and poli-
tics at multiple levels. In particular, they realized that the various levels were 
linked, and that the linkage points – between national politicians and their local 
constituents, or the IWC and Cold War tensions, for instance – were pressure 
points to be exploited. This is not to say, however, that scalability of this sort is 
easy. There has been an almost constant tension, for example, between a desire 
among local activists to maintain their autonomy and operate according to the 
principles of grass roots, consensus-based democracy, and the staff at Green-
peace International who view environmental campaigns from a transnational or 
global perspective, and for whom professionalism and hierarchy are a given.12 
Nonetheless, on the whole, Greenpeace provides us with an excellent example 
of how an understanding of scalar politics is important both to global environ-
mental NGOs and to those who study them.  
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